China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), offi cially unveiled in 2013, has been promptly placed among the top priorities of China's foreign policy. One of the BRI's cooperation priorities is unimpeded trade, which implies the improvement of the investment and trade facilitation and removal of the recurrent investment and trade barriers. Despite its apparent fl exibility and openness to embracing existing regional and multilateral platforms, there has been little debate on the compatibility of the BRI objectives with the existing economic integration projects. Th e paper is aimed at enriching this debate by addressing the relationship of the BRI with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), a regional economic grouping bringing together several of China's important BRI partners including Russia and Central Asian countries. Th e paper addresses the current progress in bridging the two grand economic projects and outlines the priority directions for further coordination between them.
Introduction
The construction of the "One Belt and One Road" should implement an innovative cooperation model, which, at the current stage, is not a supranational mechanism, nor a model at the same level with the Customs Union or the Economic Union (Feng & Wang, 2015, p. 35) .
Th e Chinese President, Xi Jinping, announced the launch of the Silk Road Economic Belt 1 at Nazarbayev University in Astana during his visit to Kazakh- , and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) 8 jointly released the Action Plan on the Belt and Road Initiative 9 . Th e BRI Action Plan labels this initiative "a positive endeavour to seek new models of international cooperation and global governance" 10 . It specifi es that the initiative "will abide by market rules and international norms" so that the market will play a decisive role in resource allocation 11 . It calls for the development of the Eurasian Land Bridge via three economic corridors: China-MongoliaRussia, China-Central Asia West Asia and the China-Indochina Peninsula 12 . Some scholars have quickly labelled the BRI vision documents as Sino-centric "extension, consolidation and political elevation of pre-existing policy ideas and practice at the sub-national level in China" (Summers, 2016 (Summers, , p. 1634 . Aft er comparison with other initiatives such as the Trans-Pacifi c Partnership, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, or the US-led New Silk Road, it was suggested that "China's new Silk Road has long-built political and developmental aspirations in the region that could not be met with alternative frameworks" (Min Ye, 2015, p. 222). 2 (7 September, 2013 ). Available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpfwzysiesgjtfh shzzfh _665686/t1076334.shtml One of the BRI's cooperation priorities is unimpeded trade, which implies the improvement of the investment and trade facilitation and removal of the recurrent investment and trade barriers. Th e BRI Action plan also provides for the opening of free trade areas (Lin, 2015) . Th e countries along the BRI are encouraged to enhance customs cooperation and to ratify and implement the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement 13 . Th e initiative calls for the lowering of non-tariff barriers, improving the transparency of technical trade measures, enhancing trade liberalization and facilitation 14 . What are the cooperation mechanisms envisaged by the BRI in order to achieve the aforementioned objectives? What sort of regulatory framework should be established for the legal support of the BRI connectivity projects? Th e BRI Action plan provides for engagement in the bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms.
See Ministry of Foreign Aff airs of the People's Republic of China, President Xi Jinping Delivers Important Speech and Proposes to Build a Silk Road Economic Belt with Central Asian Countries
Th is echoes the approach adopted at the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China: "Multilateral, bilateral, and regional opening ups and cooperation are the three important pillars of the Chinese foreign economy, trade, and cooperation" (Feng & Wang, 2015, p. 57) . For some scholars this means a platform for further dialogue and cooperation on many levels, engaging, if necessary, the existing governance structures, which is not a union or new organization with supra-national structures 15 . As noted by President Xi in his keynote speech "Towards a Community of Common Destiny and A New Future for Asia" delivered at the 2015 Boao Forum for Asia 16 in Hainan, "To develop the Belt and Road is not to replace existing mechanisms or initiatives for regional cooperation. Much to the contrary, we will build on the existing basis to help countries align their development strategies and form complementarity" 17 . While the buildup of the BRI cooperation platform and mechanisms is still an ongoing process, the contributions from various stakeholders (governmental and non-governmental, national and multinational, public and private) in various disciplines can contribute to their development. While the implementation of the BRI has been addressed in academic circles of political science (Blanchard & Flint, 2017) 18 , the discussion on its interaction with the existing economic integration projects 19 has not yet been sufficiently developed. The present paper is aimed at enriching the debate by addressing the relationship of the BRI project with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), a regional economic grouping bringing together several of China's important BRI partners. (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2017) .
Th e origins of the EAEU should be traced back to 1999 when the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus entered into an agreement to establish a union between the two countries. 20 By 2000, the project had been joined by the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and the Republic of Tajikistan transforming it into the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) 21 . Th is economic integration had been prompted by, among other things, the disastrous impact of the market-oriented economic policies on the post-Soviet economies (Dzarasov, 2016) . Th e next step envisaged by the members of the EurAsEC was the creation of the Common Economic Space, which was supposed to include Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Th is initiative, however, was short-lived due to the "orange revolution" in Ukraine in 2004 (Katchanovski, 2008) . As a result, the 2007 Agreement establishing a Customs Union was concluded by Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan
22
. Th e Agreement established the Customs Union Commission in order to monitor and foster the processes of economic integration. In January 2010 the common customs tariff Treaty on the Establishment of the Eurasian Economic Community of 10 October 2000. 22 Agreement concerning the creation of the united customs territory and the creation of the customs union of 6 October, 2007. was implemented at the external borders of the Customs Union. Th e Eurasian Economic Commission, the fi rst supra-national organization established in this region aft er the disintegration of the USSR, was headquartered in Moscow. Th e year 2015 saw the establishment and the enlargement of the EAEU to also include the Republic of Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic. On 29 May 2015 the EAEU concluded its fi rst free trade agreement -with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 23 . Today the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) brings together 182 million people; it occupies fi rst place in crude oil (14.6%), second place in natural gas (18.4%), sixth place in coal (5.8%), fourth place in electricity generation (5.1%), and fi ft h place in steel (4.5%); it has 1,605,000 km of roads (fi ft h place or 2.5%), and 107,000 km of railroads (fi rst place or 7.8%) 24 . Decision-making in the EAEU Commission is largely consensus-based with the limited use of qualifi ed majority voting for low level decisions, which on one hand slows down the effi ciency of decision-making but on the other relieves the dominance of the bigger players such as Russia (Roberts & Moshes, 2016) . For example, while the EAEU framework contains common competition rules, their enforcement is heavily reliant on the cooperation of the national competition authorities of the member states, which can obstruct the prevention and prohibition of anti-competitive business practices that may have cross-border eff ects on EAEU trade (Rudomino & Zakharov, 2014) . As a result, the supra-national structures of the EAEU are heavily reliant on the commitment of the national governments while the ideas for supra-national parliamentary integration within the EAEU 25 have not yet found any signifi cant support from the political leadership of its members.
Since its establishment, the EAEU has been followed by the discussion as to the profi tability of this economic integration for each of its members, which are diff erent in size, population and the specifi cs of their national economies. Generally, it can be argued that Russia's EAEU partners have benefi ted from the customs union, economically at least, in the following ways: the redistribution of customs tariff s (See calculations: Andronova, 2016, p. 9) and the increasing use of their transport infrastructure for the transit of Chinese exports towards the EU. Th e EU/US-Russia confrontation over Ukraine (Neuwirth & Svetlicinii, 2016 ) and Russia's ban on food imports from the EU/US and Ukraine benefi ted EAEU members such as Belarus, which signifi cantly increased its food exports into Russian markets. Th ere is also evidence of the relocation of Russian companies to Kazakhstan and Belarus due to lower taxes and lower administrative burdens in these jurisdictions (Andronova, 2016, p. 11) .
At the same time, the volumes of intra-EAEU trade are currently decreasing. For example, when compared to the period 2000-2014, the share of EAEU trade in the trade volumes of its members has been falling: Russia (7.7% to 7.1%), 23 Free Kazakhstan (20.8% to 18.4%), Belarus (58.6% to 23.8%) (Ibid., p. 14). In 2013, the transit volumes in Russia and Belarus fell, while in Kazakhstan they were on the rise. It was suggested that the transport sector of the EAEU needs a new impulse, which should be realized through the development of the transit corridors (Panteleev, Pochtarev & Chalaja, 2015) . EAEU trade can be also characterized as Russia-centered since the trade amongst other EAEU members remains marginal. For other EAEU members Russia is the largest trading partner while China is ranked second (Ustyuzhanina, 2016) . Interestingly enough, the EAEU did not undertake any signifi cant steps towards the development of the internal transport infrastructure, which would facilitate trade fl ows within the EAEU. While the establishment of the customs union had a positive eff ect on the volumes of mutual trade (between 2000 and 2013 it grew by 37%), lately it has been on the decrease due to the devaluation of the Russian currency and falling prices of the energy carriers (Ibid., p. 39). Among other problems of EAEU integration are the absence of diversifi ed exports, the undeveloped transport infrastructure and low volumes of intra-EAEU trade (Kukushkina & Ostrovskaya, 2013) .
Initially, the EAEU was regarded as a costly choice for Central Asian countries as their tariff rates in the customs union had been "russianized" i.e. increased up to levels of Russian tariff s. As a result, these countries lost a certain volume of imports from third countries to the benefi t of Russian companies. However, aft er Russia's accession to the WTO, the level of the tariff s fell by 40-50%. Additionally, the EAEU off ered further economic benefi ts to its members in the form of free movement of labour and services, eff orts to reduce non-tariff barriers and improve trade facilitation, etc. (Tarr, 2016, pp. 18-19) . At the same time, it should be noted that beyond trade liberalization (reduction and unifi cation of tariff s) there has been little coordination in other policy areas and the top-down approach adopted by the EAEU members for their economic integration has been at least partly responsible for stifl ing the innovation and competitiveness vis-a-vis other economic integration blocks such as the EU (Hartwell, 2016) . Th e economic integration scholars have continuously voiced calls for further coordination of industrial policy by establishing an EAEU ministry of economy, creation of EAEU multinationals, and fostering coordination of heavy industries and agriculture (Andronova, 2016, pp. 18-19) .
Th e situation in Ukraine has defi nitely aff ected both the prospects of further EAEU integration and the tensions amongst its members. For other members the accession of Ukraine could imply the dilution of Russia's decisive infl uence. It was argued that for EAEU members, Russia is seen both as an unavoidable partner but also a threat (Roberts & Moshes, 2015, p. 13.). Russia's ban on food imports from the EU/US and other countries (Neuwirth & Svetlicinii, 2015) was not supported by Belarus and Kazakhstan, with imports fl owing through these two EAEU member states (Roberts & Moshes, 2015, pp. 14-15; Sakwa, 2016, p. 13). It was argued that for Armenia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan the value of the EAEU is signifi cantly reduced if it undermines their relations with third countries (Roberts & Moshes, 2015, p. 18) . Aft er the Ukraine crisis and the deterioration in EU/US-Russia relations, the Asian vector received more importance as Russia turned to the East in an attempt to engage more with Greater Asia. As the EAEU was intended to grow from an economic to a geopolitical project, the events in Ukraine are an example of how geopolitics have slowed down the economic development of this ambitious integrationist project (Wilson, 2016, p. 127) .
Th ere has also been a drastic change in the rhetoric and narrative of EAEU integration discourse: while prior to the Ukraine crisis it was an all-encompassing cooperation project "from Lisbon to Vladivostok" or even "from Vancouver to Vladivostok" 26 , the confrontation with the West over Ukraine changed the dimension to "from Murmansk to Hong Kong" with Russia's focus on its bilateral relations with China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (Vysotskaya & Vieira, 2016, p. 570). Russia's actions in relation to Ukraine prompted concerns over sovereignty and territorial integrity in other EAEU members. Nevertheless, despite these tensions, "this organizational format is probably the only way for the smaller states to restrain Russia's actions as the regional hegemon" (Ibid., p. 577). Th e 2015 public opinion polls conducted in the EAEU member states indicated that citizens of Kyrgyzstan (86%), Kazakhstan (80%) and Russia (78%) overwhelmingly support the Eurasian integration processes. Th e population of Armenia (56%) and Belarus (60%) demonstrated more skepticism towards EAEU development, while Tajikistan demonstrated the highest support for this regional integrationist project among the non-EAEU countries (Kudaibergenova, 2016, p. 105). In analyzing the diverging positions of the Eurasian optimists and Eurasian skeptics, it can be argued that the EAEU project is still justifi ed by the current trends of shift ing from a state-centered system to a global system with regional associations of states (Vasilieva & Lagutina, 2013) .
Th e BRI and the EAEU: Aligning the Expectations

Th e dynamics of the world economy, which has entered the fourth industrial revolution, have raised the issue of "integrating the integrations"; the formation of common points of economic growth between the Eurasian Economic Union and the "Economic belt of the Great Silk Road" has huge prospects
.
China's experience in interacting with the EAEU countries as a group can be traced to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). All EAEU members are involved in the works of the SCO (Belarus is an observer state and Armenia is a dialogue partner). It was established in 2001 by Kazakhstan, China, the Kyrgyz Republic, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 28 . At the 2016 SCO Summit in Tashkent, India and Pakistan initiated their process of accession to the SCO, which 26 As suggested by the Russian Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Sergey Lavrov, "Th e new union will be open for interested countries to join. We expect it to become a hub eff ectively connecting Europe and the Asia-Pacifi c". Lavrov 29 . Relations between the SCO and the forerunner to the EAEU, the EurAsEC, began in 2006 with the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the executive secretariat of EurAsEC and the permanent secretariat of the SCO 30 . As discussed above, the EAEU was initially envisaged as an economic union, leading to further political alignment of its member states. Th e SCO, on the other hand, fi rst emerged as a peace-building and border disputes resolution mechanism. Th e institutional structures of the two organizations are also quite diff erent as EAEU encompasses two supra-national institutions (the Eurasian Economic Commission and the Court) while the SCO functions on an intra-state level through periodic meetings.
China has already attempted to promote greater economic integration through the SCO but with limited success as the organization continued to focus primarily on security issues. Since China will continue promoting economic integration in Eurasia, which will involve the EAEU states, it was argued that further coordination between the EAEU and the SCO is inevitable and should be encouraged (Yu Bin, 2015) . For example, in 2015 the EAEU and the SCO held a joint business forum in St Petersburg where they launched a proposal concerning the development of a common digital space between the members of the two organizations 31 . At their 2016 summit the SCO leaders reaffi rmed their support for the BRI and expressed their interest in developing further cooperation along the Great Silk Road in various areas: public health, science and technology, education, environment protection, sports, tourism, and the study and preservation of cultural and natural heritage 32 . Some scholars believe that the signifi cant attempts to establish a meaningful cooperation between the SCO (a primarily security-oriented organization) and the EAEU (economic integration) could eventually lead to the establishment of a comprehensive Silk Road Union (Kembayev, 2016) .
Th e economic cooperation dialogue between China and the EAEU commenced prior to the announcement of the BRI. On 6 December 2012 the EAEU Commission and the MOFCOM concluded a Memorandum of Understanding concerning cooperation in trade matters 33 . A decision to start formal negotiations between the EAEU and China on the conclusion of a comprehensive product and transport vehicle in- . In a joint statement released on 8 May 2015, the EAEU Commission and the MOFCOM announced the launch of negotiations for the conclusion of the trade and economic cooperation agreement between China and the EAEU 35 . It should be noted, however, that the free trade arrangement between China and the EAEU can currently only be achieved in relation to trade in goods, as the trade in services and the coordination of such with third countries is left by the EAEU Treaty to its member states 36 . On 8 May 2015 Russia and China issued a joint statement concerning cooperation for conjunction of the EAEU and BRI, where Russia expressed its support for BRI while China agreed with Russian eff orts in developing EAEU economic integration 37 . Th e parties agreed to cooperate on a bilateral level as well as through the SCO platform. Th e following directions for cooperation were mapped in the Joint Statement: (1) trade and investment facilitation; (2) joint investment projects; (3) enhancing infrastructure connectivity; (4) Despite the rapid developments in BRI-EAEU dialogue, the scholars have noted the diff erences in approaches towards the BRI by the two leading counterparts: Russia and China. In Russia, the Silk Road has traditionally been regarded as a transport infrastructure connecting East and West where Russia would play a key role as the 34 Eurasian Economic Commission, Decision on initiation of negotiations with the People's Republic of China regarding conclusion of an agreement on exchange of information regarding goods and vehicles of international carriage carried across customs borders between the customs union and the People's Republic of China. It has been argued that the formulation of the free trade area should be regarded as at most medium-term or even a long-term goal of the BRI. See: (Zeng, 2016) . bridge connecting these two parts of the world. Th e EAEU from the outset had a dualist nature: on one hand it was seen as an extension of "greater Europe" from "Lisbon to Vladivostok" 40 , but with the rise of China it also received a strong Asian vector (Sakwa, 2016, p. 5) . For China, however, the BRI is primarily a "belt" rather than a "road", meaning a space of economic development and prosperity where highly developed states are engaged in an intensive trade exchange (Makarov & Sokolova, 2016 pp. 48-50) . What makes the 21st century Silk Road diff erent from the ancient one is that today this road passes through sovereign states with diff erent political and economic objectives. As a result, one of the few issues that all of these Central Eurasian states have unanimously supported was the improvement of border management (Diener, 2015) . Since the BRI is essentially based on the increase of various fl ows (goods, services, and people) across those borders, this will present a tremendous challenge for those states inclined to protect their territorial sovereignty. In this sense, the builders of the BRI will have much to learn from the positive experience of the EAEU, which at least shares a common history of such fl ows in the modern era and has to a certain degree progressed in this direction (free fl ow of goods, no visa regimes, abolition of border controls, etc.).
It should be also noted that the establishment of the EAEU was based on WTO standards and used the EU model of institutional integration (EAEU Commission and EAEU Court) to indicate the potential of establishing a free trade zone with the EU (Kukushkina & Ostrovskaya, 2013) . A hastening in recognition of the EAEU by the EU would be achieved by the accession of Kazakhstan 41 and Belarus to the WTO. With the expansion of EU-China trade exchanges, the EAEU may lose sense as a common economic space. But, the success of the BRI will also rest on a good Russia-China relationship. If these are to deteriorate, "Russia will employ confl ictual policies towards the countries of the Eurasian periphery to increase the costs of their rapprochement with China" (Samokhvalov, 2016) . It should be noted that despite the current cordial relations between Russia and China, China's rising power and its overwhelming economic capabilities in comparison with Russia create a growing power disparity and the maintenance of some sort of equilibrium in Russian-Chinese interactions is a challenge (Wilson, 2016, p. 114 . See also: Grigorenko, Klyuchnikov, Gridchina, Litvinenko & Kolpak, 2016). Th is serves as another argument in favour of engagement with Russia through the EAEU.
When discussing the rationale of other post-Soviet states that have not joined the EAEU project (Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan) one should note their attempt to avoid Russian infl uence. But for most of these states the Russian vector is unavoidable so they will inevitably be involved in some sort of economic integration with Russia or its regional initiatives (see e.g.: Korosteleva, 2015) . At the same time, all of the above countries have expressed their interest in taking part in BRI projects. It was argued that in this context the institutionalization of this process will provide for more stability in the regional policies of the post-Soviet states but does Th e EAEU, the SCO and the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) (see generally: Neuwirth, Svetlicinii & De Castro Halis (eds), (2017)) have been regarded as "the embryo of post-Western order" (Sakwa, 2016, p. 18) and the BRI led by China engages numerous members of these economic and political groupings. Up until now, BRI development has been pursued primarily on a bilateral level between China and the interested countries along the envisaged BRI routes. It was argued that the BRI should be viewed primarily as a cooperation platform rather than a formal economic integration model like the EU or the EAEU (see: Yang Cheng, 2015, p. 285). Nevertheless, despite its apparent fl exibility and openness to embrace the existing regional and multilateral platforms, there has been little debate on the compatibility of the BRI objectives with the existing economic integration projects. Th e present paper has been an attempt to address the possibility of integration of the BRI projects with the existing economic governance framework of the EAEU.
Both the EAEU and the BRI projects have been criticized for the stark inequality of the participating members. Th e discrepancies in size among member states culminated in palpable state-centric concerns that the EAEU would facilitate Russian hegemony in Central Asia while the BRI and SCO could lay the foundation for Chinese dominance (Gatev & Diesen, 2016, p. 146) . For the same reasons it could be benefi cial for the EAEU members to act together as a stronger negotiating partner with China, and for China it could be a faster step towards a single tariff and single customs zone of the EAEU (Ibid., p. 139).
When discussing Eurasian economic integration, Russian scholars noted that one of the intellectual problems of the EAEU is that Russia was always clear about what it builds but not why it builds these structures, and the EAEU project has never been properly addressed by Russian high-ranking offi cials (Bratersky, 2016 , p. 67). As was suggested above, the true intentions and possible implications of the BRI project go far beyond economic rationale. In this sense, the promoters of the BRI could learn from the EAEU experience and make sure that non-economic objectives are clearly presented, widely publicized and accepted by the countries that join the initiative.
As demonstrated above, the envisaged BRI encompasses all EAEU members, which make the interaction of these two economic cooperation and integration platforms inevitable. Th e scholars have outlined various directions for EAEU develop-ment along the BRI such as: integration in the transport and logistics infrastructure of Eurasia, the strengthening of trans-border industrial cooperation, and the enhancement of economic integration up to the establishment of the comprehensive Eurasian union (Makarov & Sokolova, 2016, p. 52) . Regardless of its actual path, the "integration of integrations" in the case of the BRI and the EAEU is a reality and further academic debate on their conjugation should be encouraged.
